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CASE SUMMARIES 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
COLACURCIO v. CITY OF KEN!' 
163 F.3d 545 (9th Cir. 1998) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Colacurcio v. City of Kent,! the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the City of Kent's Ordi-
nance 3221,2 which required nude dancers to perform at least 
ten feet from patrons, did not violate the First Amendment3 of 
the United States Constitution. The court found that, as a 
matter of law, the Kent ordinance was content-neutral and the 
ten-foot distance requirement was narrowly tailored and left 
1. 163 F.3d 545 (9th Cir. 1998). The appeal from the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Washington was argued and submitted on April 10, 
1998 before Chief Judge Hug and Circuit Judges Reinhardt and Wiggins. The decision 
was fIled on December 8, 1998. Chief Judge Hug authored the opinion. Judge 
Reinhardt filed a dissenting opinion. 
2. "The portion of the exotic dance studio premises in which dancing and adult 
entertainment by an entertainer is performed shall be a stage or platform at least 
twenty-four (24) inches in elevation above the level of the patron seating areas." Kent 
City Code § 5.10.110(A). "No dancing or adult entertainment by an entertainer shall 
occur closer than ten (10) feet to any patron." [d., § 5.10.120(A)(3). 
3. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
41 
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open ample alternative avenues for communication of protected 
expression. 4 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Appellants Frank Colacurcio, David Ebert, and Steve Fues-
ton desired to open a non-alcohol serving adult nightclub in the 
City of Kent, Washington, featuring nude dancing on stage and 
personalized table dances./l The appellants claimed that the 
ten-foot rule would effectively eliminate table dancing which, 
unlike nude dancing performed on a stage, requires dancers to 
be in close proximity to the patrons.6 Thus, the appellants con-
tended that the City's ordinance violated the United States 
Constitution for it amounted to a complete ban on table danc-
ing which is a unique form of expression entitled to separate 
First Amendment analysis. 7 They then filed suit in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Washington 
seeking declaratory relief and damages.8 
In response, the City of Kent filed a motion for summary 
judgment.9 In granting summary judgment, the district court 
ruled that (1) the ordinance was a content-neutral time, place, 
and manner regulation; and (2) the ten-foot distance require-
ment was narrowly tailored and left open ample alternative 
avenues for communication of protected artistic expression. 10 
The appellants appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 
4. See Colacurcio v. City of Kent, 163 F.3d 545, 557 (9th Cir. 1998). 
5. See id. at 548. The Kent City Council had examined the issues related to 
adult entertainment for many years and, in 1995, adopted Adult Entertainment 
Ordinance 3214. See id. at 548. In 1996 it amended Ordinance 3214 by adding 
Ordinance 3221. Shortly thereafter, appellants filed their suit. See id. at 549. 
6. See Colacurcw, 163 F.3d. at 549. 
7. See id. at 548. In addition, appellants argue that table dancing is the primary 
source of income for exotic dancers and the Kent ordinance would make it 
uneconomical and therefore impossible for exotic dance studios to open or operate. 
This would deprive dancers of their employment opportunity. See id. at 549. 
8. See id. at 549. 
9. See Colacurcw, 163 F.3d at 549. The United States District Court for the 
Western District of Washington, Judge Thomas S. ZiIly, granted summary judgment in 
November of1996. See id. at 548. 
10. See id. at 549. 
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III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A THE MAJORITY OPINION 
Chief Judge Hug, writing for the majority, began by ana-
lyzing the level of protection traditionally reserved for nude 
dancing. According to Chief Judge Hug, the fragmented nature 
of the United States Supreme Court opinions dealing with 
nude dancing in particular and sexually explicit but non-
obscene conduct in general, resulted in a lack of clear guidance 
on the level of First Amendment protection afforded to this 
type of expression. 11 Likewise, scholars such as Lawrence 
Tribe12 and Erwin Chemerinsky13 had grappled with the prob-
lem of the uncertain status of nude dancing and adult enter-
tainment under the First Amendment. 
The Ninth Circuit focused on the appellants' contention that 
the district court erred in determining that the Kent ordinance 
was content-neutral as a matter of law. 1. In accordance with 
the United States Supreme Court opinion in Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism,16 the Ninth Circuit concluded that municipali-
ties may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and 
manner of protected speech provided that the restrictions are: 
(1) content-neutral; (2) narrowly tailored to serve significant 
11. See id. at 550. 
12. See LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 12-18, p. 938 (2d 
ed. 1988). Professor Tribe noted that uno court has yet squarely held that sexually 
explicit but non-obscene speech enjoys less than full First Amendment protection." See 
also Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 550. 
13. See ERWIN CHEMEmNSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 11.3.4.4. p. 836-41 (1st ed. 
1997). Professor Chemerinsky views Supreme Court precedent as according sexually 
explicit expression UJow value" status. See also Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 550. 
14. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 550. Appellants argued that the ordinance was 
content-based on its face and that the record showed that the city's predominant intent 
in passing the ordinance was to ban all adult entertainment in Kent. See id. This 
contention was based on statements made by the mayor and other city officials, in 
addition to the City's alleged pattern of adopting restrictive ordinances in response to 
proposals to build exotic dance studios. See id. at 551. 
15. 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
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governmental interests; and (3) leave open ample alternative 
channels of communication. 16 
The court acknowledged that the ordinance would meet the 
content-neutral requirement if it was aimed at controlling the 
secondary effects of the banned activity or of the protected ex-
pression. 17 In addition, the Court disagreed with the appel-
lants' claim that the purpose of the ordjnance was to suppress 
speech.18 The court concluded that because the ordinance was 
aimed at controlling prostitution, drug dealing, and other 
criminal activity, the Kent ordjnance was justified without ref-
erence to speech suppression. 19 
The appellants also contended that the ten-foot distance 
requirement was not narrowly tailored because the City could 
have used less restrictive means to achieve the same result. 20 
The court disagreed, however, finding that the appellants 
failed to present evidence that showed that the ten-foot rule 
substantially burdened more expression than necessary to 
achieve its purposes. 21 
16. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 551 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 
U.S. 781, 791 (1989». 
17. See id. at 55l. Such secondary effects include threats to public health and 
safety resulting from the protected expression 88 opposed to the protected expression 
itself. See id. at 55l. Contrary to appellants' contention, the court found that the Kent 
ordinance was not content-based on its face because the ordinance did not distinguish 
between table dancing and other exotic dance forms, nor did the ten-foot distance 
requirement apply solely to table dancing. See id. at 552. 
18. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 552. Appellants cited various statements made by 
city officials and others allegedly revealing the City's underlying speech-suppressive 
purposes. For example, appellants quote the following statement from the Planning 
Committee Chairman: ·With all the regulations we have adopted, I'm not too concerned 
that someone's going to come and try to open something up. Because we've made it a 
little bit difficult for them to make money in the traditional way they make money.n ld. 
at 552. The court disagreed and noted that the ordinance was based on a 
comprehensive study of adult entertainment businesses and their secondary impacts. 
See id. at 553. 
19. See id. at 553. 
20. See id. at 553. 
21. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 554 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 798-799). Chief 
Judge Hug explained that a regulation of time, place, or manner must be narrowly 
tailored to serve the government's legitimate content-neutral interests, but it need not 
be the least restrictive means of doing so. See id. at 554. Chief Judge Hug continued: 
"Rather, the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied 'so long as the ... regulation 
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The court next addressed the appellants' argument that the 
Kent ordinance failed to leave open ample alternative channels 
of communication.22 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that 
what made this case unusual was the appellants' claim that 
table dancing was a unique form of protected expression that 
was qualitatively different from nude stage dancing thereby 
entitling it to a separate First Amendment analysis. ~ The 
court held that even if table dancing was a unique form of ex-
pression, case precedent indicated that uniqueness alone was 
insufficient to trigger separate First Amendment protection. 24 
Further, the Ninth Circuit found the appellants' alternative 
avenues of communication argument flawed because govern-
mental interests protected by the enactment must also be 
taken into account.25 The Court concluded that table dancing 
in private nightclubs, an activity with documented links to 
prostitution and drug dealing, was a highly unlikely candidate 
for special protection under the First Amendment. 26 
Next, the court addressed the appellants' argument that the 
applicable "forum" for a table dance was not the whole cabaret, 
but merely the area required for perl'orming the table dance. 27 
The court disagreed with the appellants' attempt to extend the 
public forum principle to private nightclubs.28 
promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively 
absent the regulation.'" Id. at 554 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 
689 (1995». 
22. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 555. AB established in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of 
San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 525-27, (1981), the Supreme Court generally will not strike 
down a governmental action for failure to leave open ample alternative channels of 
communication unless the government enactment will foreclose an entire medium of 
public expression across the landscape of a particular community or setting. See id. at 
555. Appellants claimed Kent's ten-foot distance requirement would eliminate table 
dancing altogether because an essential element is close proximity between dancers 
and patrons. See id. at 555. 
23. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d. at 555. 
24. See id. 
25. See id. 
26. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 556. 
27. See id. 
28. See id. According to Chief Judge Hug: 
Appellants' fluid definition of relevant forums, if carried to its logical 
conclusion, would require courts to subdivide audiences to the extent that any 
speech-restrictive regulation would necessarily fail.... The district court was 
5
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Lastly, the court rejected the appellants' economic argument 
that the income from table dances was the dancers main source 
of income.29 Unconvinced by this argument, the Court stated 
that "the fact that appellants hire their dancers on an inde-
pendent contractor basis, refuse to pay their dancers for danc-
ing on stage, require their dancers to pay rental fees, and limit 
their dancers' remuneration to tips from patrons, appears to us 
to be an effort to maximize profits while minimizing dancers' 
economic security."30 Therefore, this argument failed because 
the appellants did not produce economic evidence sufficient to 
show that the ten-foot distance rule would result in an absolute 
bar to market entry. The appellants merely established a po-
tentialloss in profits, which arguably could be remedied by re-
structuring the way in which they conducted business. 31 
B. THE DISSENTING OPINION 
In the dissenting opinion, Circuit Judge Reinhardt stated 
that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in 
favor of the City of Kent.32 Judge Reinhardt articulated a more 
narrow issue as to whether table dancing constituted a sepa-
rate form of expressive communication that differentiated it 
from other types of nude dancing.33 According to Judge Rein-
hardt, the appellants presented sufficient evidence to establish 
a triable issue of fact so as to survive the City's summary 
judgment motion.34 
[d. 
correct in rejecting this proposition. If forum analysis is relevant here, the 
appropriate forum is the entire cabaret. 
29. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 556-557. Appellants alleged that income from 
table dances is the main source of revenue for appellants' entertainters who are not 
compensated for stage dances because the dancers in appellants' establishments are 
independent contractors who pay rental fees to the dance studios. See id. at 556-557. 
These fees are the appellants' primary source ofrevenue. See id. at 557. 
30. Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 557. 
31. See id. 
32. See id. at 558. (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
33. See id. at 558. Judge Reinhardt also stated that whether the message being 
communicated by a table dancer was different in content from that communicated by a 
nude stage dancer was an important factor for analysis. See id. at 558. 
34. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 558. The appellants introduced the testimony of 
cultural anthropologist Judith Hanna and University of California, Santa Barb.ara 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF DECISION 
This case illustrates the Ninth Circuit's lack of clear, consti-
tutional guidelines regarding the level of First Amendment 
protection afforded controversial activities such as nude danc-
ing. As Chief Judge Hug noted, nude dancing is a form of ex-
pressive conduct protected, to some degree, by the First 
Amendment.35 However, the court addressed the area of per-
sonalized table dancing, a socially unpopular form of expres-
sion, quite cautiously. Although this type of expression in gen-
eral falls within the parameters of the First Amendment, the 
Ninth Circuit was nonetheless hesitant to render a decision 
that would more clearly derme the type of expressive activity 
entitled to First Amendment protection. 
In addition, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the United States 
District Court's grant of summary judgment as a matter of law. 
In so doing, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that while nude 
dancing does enjoy some First Amendment protection, it is far 
easier to derme what forms are not protected than to clarify 
what is covered.a6 
Communications Department Chair Edward Donnerstein. Both Hanna and 
Donnerstein contrasted the message sent by physical closeness with that sent by the 
distance imposed by stage dancing which, Hanna testified, transmits an entirely 
different signal: "coldness and impersonality." See id. at 559. According to Judge 
Reinhardt: 
Appellants, by producing these declarations (testimony of Judith Hanna and 
Edward Donnerstein) have created a material question of fact regarding 
whether table dancing is, as the district court and the msjority conclude, 
merely stage dancing at a 'louder volume,' or whether it is an altogether 
different form of expression that depends upon proximity, and communicates a 
different and particular content. 
[d. Judge Reinhardt would have reversed summary judgment because he believed the 
factual issues created by the appellants' expert testimony raised questions for a jury. 
See id. at 559. 
35. See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 549-550. 
36. This approach is similar in content to the view expressed by Justice Potter 
Stewart in his concurring opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963). 
Justice Stewart, in concluding that criminal obscenity laws were constitutionally 
limited under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to hard-core pornography, stated: 
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand 
to be embraced within that shorthand description (hard-core pornography); 
and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when 
I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that. 
Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 197. 
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Despite a lack of established guidelines, the Ninth Circuit's 
holding is consistent with other appellate court decisions on the 
constitutionality of municipally imposed distance requirements 
between nude dancers and patrons. The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit encountered a similar issue 
when the validity of a Chattanooga, Tennessee ordinance re-
quiring a six-foot buffer zone between nude dancers and pa-
trons was challenged.37 While the Sixth Circuit analyzed the 
buffer zone issue differently than the Ninth Circuit,38 it none-
theless arrived at a similar conclusion: a municipally imposed 
distance requirement between nude dancers and patrons is 
constitutional so long as it furthers sufficient governmental 
objectives such as the prevention of prostitution, drug dealing, 
and disease.39 
Zachary J. Dalton * 
37. See DLS, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 107 F.3d 403 (6th Cir. 1997). In DLS, 
owners and employees of an adult cabaret challenged a city ordinance that regulated 
adult-oriented establishments. Although the DLS court addressed a variety of issues, a 
large portion of the opinion concerned the constitutionality of Chattanooga City Code § 
11-435 (d). See id. at 406. This statute required all performances to occur at least six 
feet from the nearest entertainer, employee, and/or customer. See id. The Sixth 
Circuit held that the ordinance provision prohibiting performers from approaching 
within six feet of customers did not violate the First Amendment. See id. at 413. 
38. See DLS, 107 F.3d at 409. The Sixth Circuit recognized that erotic dancing is 
not necessarily "expressive activity," as a matter of law, for First Amendment 
purposes. Rather, the message communicated by nude dancing was "an endorsement 
of erotic experience" as opposed to speech. See id. at 409. In this regard, DLS differed 
from Colacurcio, where appellants provided evidence to qualify nude table dancing as 
an expressive form of communication because of it's message. 
39. See DLS, 107 F.3d at 410. The Sixth Circuit held that appellants were 
incorrect in claiming that the six-foot distance rule failed to further governmental 
interests. The Sixth Circuit found that the requirement of a six-foot buffer zone 
furthered the important state interests of the prevention of crime and the prevention of 
disease. See id. at 410-411. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 2000. 
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